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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JAMES DEITER, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No. 970555-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from two convictions for possession of 
a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, one a third degree 
felony and one a second degree felony. This Court has 
jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(2)(e)(1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Was the evidence sufficient to support a 
determination that defendant possessed a "firearm" where two 
police officers testified that they saw defendant holding a 
rifle, where moments before defendant had stated to the 911 
operator that if anyone came into his home, he would "put some 
holes" in them or "shoot" them, and where two .22 caliber 
bullets were later found on defendant's dresser? 
1 
A criminal conviction will be reversed for insufficient 
evidence only when the evidence is "so inconclusive or so 
inherently improbable that ^reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt' that the defendant committed 
the crime." State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 
1994)(quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983), 
superseded on other grounds. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 
(Utah 1987)) . 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying 
defendant's motion for a new trial on the ground that the 
error it had admittedly committed in limiting cross-
examination of a witness was not harmful? 
"The decision to grant or deny a new trial is a matter of 
discretion with the trial court and will not be reversed 
absent a clear abuse of that discretion." State v. Williams, 
712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985). In general, an appellate court 
"will presume that the discretion of the trial court was 
properly exercised unless the record clearly shows the 
contrary." Goodman v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 534-35 (Utah 
1984). To constitute an abuse of discretion, the trial 
court's determination must be "beyond the limits of 
reasonability." State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 
1992). 
3. Did the trial court properly refuse to instruct the 
jury on compulsion, defense of habitation, and force in 
2 
defense of a person, where the only factual predicate for 
giving such instructions was that one night defendant heard a 
noise on his porch or at his front door that prompted him to 
call 911? 
A trial court's refusal to give a jury instruction 
presents a question of law, which an appellate court reviews 
under a correction of error standard. State v. James, 819 
P.2d 781, 798 (Utah 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (1996), governing possession 
of dangerous weapons by restricted persons, provides in 
pertinent part: 
(2)(a) Any person who is on parole or 
probation for a felony may not have in his 
possession or under his custody or control 
any dangerous weapon as defined in Section 
76-10-501. 
(b) Any person who violates this 
subsection is guilty of a third degree 
felony, but if the dangerous weapon is a 
firearm, explosive, or incendiary device 
he is guilty of a second degree felony. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-501 (1996), supplying definitions 
for the weapons part of the Code, provided: 
(d) "Dangerous weapon" means any item that 
in the manner of its use or intended use 
is capable of causing death or serious 
bodily injury. The following factors 
shall be used in determining whether a 
knife, or any other item, object, or thing 
not commonly known as a dangerous weapon 
is a dangerous weapon: 
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(i) the character of the instrument, 
object, or thing; 
(ii) the character of the wound 
produced, if any; 
(iii) the manner in which the 
instrument, object, or thing was 
used; and 
(iv) the other lawful purposes for 
which the instrument, object, or 
thing may be used. 
(g) "Firearm" means a pistol, revolver, 
shotgun, sawed-off shotgun, rifle or 
sawed-off rifle, or any devise that could 
be used as a dangerous weapon from which 
is expelled a projectile by action of an 
explosive. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with two counts of possession of a 
dangerous weapon by a restricted person, one a third degree 
felony and one a second degree felony, arising out of 
incidents that occurred on two different dates in late 1996 
(R. 1-2). Defendant was tried by a jury, found guilty as 
charged, and sentenced to one term of zero-to-five years and 
an additional concurrent term of one-to-fifteen years, both in 
the Utah State Prison, with credit for time served in jail (R. 
106-07). Following the trial court's denial of several post-
trial motions, defendant filed this timely appeal (R. 162-65, 
164A). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Rifle Incident 
At two a.m. on October 20, 1996, the 911 operator in Box 
4 
Elder County received a telephone call from defendant (R. 261, 
263). Defendant identified himself, gave his address, 
reported that he was in his bedroom, and told the operator 
that he thought someone had come through the front door into 
his home (R. 264). The operator testified that defendant told 
her that if anyone "came through the door after him he would 
put some holes in them" (Id.). She further testified: 
He said that I didn't need to send anyone 
out, that he just wanted, for the record, 
[sic] that if he went out of the bedroom 
into the front room and at that point 
there was someone there, he would shoot 
them; and that he was in fear for his life 
at that point. 
Id. The dispatcher sent two officers to defendant's home. 
Drawing an inference from defendant's statements, the 
dispatcher told the officers that defendant had a gun (R. 
266-67). 
Five minutes later, the officers arrived at defendant's 
home (R. 327). Officer Beard testified: "When I approached, 
Mr. Deiter came out and he had a semi-automatic rifle in the 
port arms position. . . . I instructed Jim to put the gun 
away, at which time he put it inside the door, leaned it up 
against a wall" (R. 328). When asked to describe the rifle, 
Officer Beard, a gun collector as well as a long-time trap 
shooter and hunter, replied: "It appeared to be a semi-
automatic .22 with a blued barrel, blue receiver, wood forearm 
and wood stock" (R. 329). Officer Ricketts, who was riding 
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with Officer Beard that night, also testified that defendant 
was holding a rifle (R. 360, 375). 
After talking briefly with defendant, the officers 
checked the area. Finding no one, they left the premises (R. 
328-29). 
The Bow and Arrow Incident 
On December 3, 1996, Adult Probation and Parole agent 
Dale Smith, along with defendant's supervising agent and a 
third officer, visited defendant at his home (R. 376-77). At 
that time, Smith found a compound hunting bow with a 65-pound 
draw weight, painted in camouflage colors, in defendant's 
bedroom, next to his bed (R. 385) . Smith testified that he 
"noticed that there was an arrow in [the bow], meaning that 
the notch of the arrow was on the draw string. The arrow was 
laying on the - I think it's called a rest on the bow" (R. 
383). The agent further described the location of the bow and 
arrow within the bedroom: 
The bow was leaning against this bed table 
which was directly next to the bed. . . . 
The pointed end of the arrow was pointed 
away, the feathered end of the arrow was 
pointing towards the bed. From laying in 
bed, it was as you would hold it. 
(Id.). Agent Smith testified that the loaded bow was within 
arm's reach of the bed (Id.). In addition, Smith observed a 
second arrow leaning up against the night stand (R. 386). He 
also found two .22 caliber shells on top of the dresser in 
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defendant's bedroom (R. 422). 
Based on this evidence, after 55 minutes of deliberation, 
the jury convicted defendant, as charged, of two counts of 
possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person (R. 
94, 514) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant first claims that the evidence was insufficient 
to prove that he possessed a "firearm" because there was no 
proof that the rifle he was holding was actually operable. At 
the outset, this issue may be waived because defendant has 
failed to adequately brief it or to marshal the evidence in 
support of the verdict. On the merits, the argument fails 
because the statute defining "firearm" contains no requirement 
that a rifle must be operable to be so defined. In addition, 
defendant's interpretation would contradict the purpose of the 
statute as articulated by the Utah Supreme Court. When the 
statute is properly interpreted, the evidence plainly 
supports the verdict. 
Next, defendant claims that the trial court committed 
reversible error in refusing to allow a witness to be 
questioned about whether he had given defendant permission to 
possess a hunting bow. In denying defendant's motion for a 
new trial on this ground, the trial court agreed that it had 
erred but found the error harmless. Indeed, on the facts, the 
error worked defendant no harm. The rejected testimony, which 
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ultimately was elicited at sentencing, proved to be equivocal 
at best. Had it come in at trial, it would have fallen well 
short of establishing that the witness gave defendant 
permission to possess the bow under the circumstances of this 
case, thus providing defendant with a possible defense to the 
charge of possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted 
person. 
Finally, defendant asserts that the trial court 
improperly refused to give his requested jury instructions on 
compulsion, force in defense of a person, and defense of 
habitation. In essence, defendant asserts that his fear of 
someone entering his home provided him with defenses that 
relieved him, as a restricted person, of the prohibition 
against possessing a dangerous weapon. As to compulsion, the 
jury had before it no evidence to suggest that defendant's 
possession of the rifle was in any way coerced. As to the 
instructions addressing force in defense of a person and 
defense of habitation, by their very terms they apply only to 
the use or threatened use of force, neither of which is 
relevant to the possession charge at issue here. Because 
defendant's requested instructions had no factual or legal 
relevance to his case, the trial court properly rejected them. 
8 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
WHEN THE STATUTORY DEFINITION OF 
"FIREARM" IS PROPERLY 
INTERPRETED, THE JURY'S 
CONCLUSION THAT DEFENDANT WAS 
UNLAWFULLY IN POSSESSION OF A 
DANGEROUS WEAPON, TO WIT, A 
FIREARM, IS AMPLY SUPPORTED BY 
THE EVIDENCE 
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to 
prove that he possessed a "firearm," an essential element of 
the second degree felony of which he was convicted (Br. of 
App. at 10).* He grounds this argument on the assumption that 
in order to qualify as a "firearm," a weapon must be capable 
of "expel[ling] a projectile by means of an explosion." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-501(2) (g) . Defendant's argument fails 
because he has misinterpreted the controlling statute. When 
properly read, the statute provides ample support for the 
conclusion drawn by the jury that defendant was unlawfully in 
possession of a dangerous weapon; to wit, a firearm. 
Section 76-10-503(2)(a) prohibits a convicted felon on 
1
 At the outset, this claim may be disposed of on the basis 
of inadequate briefing. Defendant has failed to muster any legal 
support for his position. Indeed, his argument on this point is 
devoid of even a single case citation. See, e.g., State v. 
Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984); State v. Wareham, 772 
P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989). In addition, he has failed to marshal 
the evidence in support of the jury's verdict, another 
prerequisite for appellate review. See, e.g. State v. Chavez, 
840 P.2d 846, 848 (Utah App. 1992) cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 
(Utah 1993). 
9 
parole or probation from possessing a dangerous weapon. 
Section 76-10-503 (2) (b) penalizes such conduct as a third 
degree felony, "but if the dangerous weapon is a firearm . . 
., he is guilty of a second degree felony. Utah Code Ann. § 
76-10-503(2) (b) (1996) . Section 76-10-501(2) (g), defining 
"firearm," provides: 
(g) "Firearm" means a pistol, revolver, 
shotgun, sawed-off shotgun, rifle or 
sawed-off rifle, or any device that could 
be used as a dangerous weapon from which 
is expelled a projectile by action of an 
explosive. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-501(2) (g) (1996). The gravamen of 
defendant's complaint is that the trial court misinterpreted 
the statutory definition of firearm (Br. of App. at 10). He 
thinks that the phrase "from which is expelled a projectile by 
action of an explosive" modifies the six enumerated weapons 
(R. 300-02). In essence, then, under defendant's 
interpretation, a pistol, revolver, shotgun, sawed-off 
shotgun, rifle or sawed-off rifle would only be considered a 
"firearm" if the State proved that it was actually capable of 
expelling "a projectile by action of an explosive." 
Defendant's argument fails on the plain language of the 
statute. See, e.g., Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 850 
n.14 (Utah 1994) (explaining that statutory language is the 
first source of statutory interpretation); Brinkerhoff v. 
Forsvth, 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989) (where statutory 
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language is plain, appellate court will look no further). On 
its face, the firearms statute lists six weapons that are 
explicitly defined as firearms: a pistol, revolver, shotgun, 
sawed-off shotgun, rifle or sawed-off rifle. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-10-501 (2) (g) . The definition ends with a catch-all 
provision, phrased in the alternative: "or any device that 
could be used as a dangerous weapon from which is expelled a 
projectile by action of an explosive." Id. Thus, if the item 
is not one of the six enumerated weapons but possesses the 
characteristics delineated in the catch-all provision, it will 
be categorized as a firearm. 
Defendant imposes an interpretation on this statute that 
is contrary to the grammatical structure of the statute. At 
the outset, he separates the opening phrase of the catch-all 
provision, "or any device that could be used as a dangerous 
weapon," from its modifier, "from which is expelled a 
projectile by action of an explosive." See Br. of App. at 10-
11. He then applies the modifier to the six enumerated 
weapons. This interpretation plainly violates the grammatical 
structure of the statute. 
In addition, the statutory intent underlying section 76-
10-503 (2) (d), defining "dangerous weapon," mandates against 
defendant's interpretation of "firearm" as only an operable 
explosive weapon: 
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The argument that a gun is only a 
dangerous weapon when it is loaded and 
ready to be fired was rejected by this 
Court in State v. Nielsen, Utah, 544 P.2d 
489 (1975), cert, denied, 425 U.S. 906 
(1976), where we said that "the statute's 
purpose was to deter those convicted of 
violent crimes from thereafter having 
guns, loaded or unloaded" 544 P.2d at 490. 
State v. Davis, 711 P.2d 232, 234 (Utah 1985). Consequently, 
given the statute's purpose, whether a dangerous weapon is 
loaded or unloaded is irrelevant. Similarly, because a 
firearm is definitionally a dangerous weapon, whether the 
weapon is operable or inoperable must also be irrelevant. 
When the term "firearm" is properly interpreted, the 
evidence plainly suffices to support the jury's verdict. See 
State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 285 (Utah 1989) ("Where there 
is any evidence, including reasonable inferences that can be 
drawn from it, from which findings of all the elements of the 
crime can be made beyond a reasonable doubt, our inquiry is 
complete and we will sustain the verdict"), cert, denied, 494 
U.S. 1090 (1990). 
In the light most favorable to the verdict, the jury had 
before it the following evidence. Defendant called the 911 
operator at 2 a.m. and reported that he was fearful that 
someone was breaking into his home (R. 264). He stated that 
he "would put some holes" in the person and that he "would 
shoot them" (R. 264-65, 280-81). The operator inferred from 
these statements that defendant had a gun and, if necessary, 
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would use it (R. 266). When the officers arrived at 
defendant's home, they saw him on the lighted porch with a 
rifle in his arms, thus confirming the dispatcher's inference 
(R. 328, 330, 360, 375) .2 Six weeks later, when searching 
defendant's home during a parole visit, an Adult Probation and 
Parole officer found two .22 caliber shells on the top of 
defendant's dresser in his bedroom (R. 422). 
Based on this evidence, a jury could reasonably infer 
that defendant was in possession of a firearm; to wit, a 
rifle, on October 20, 1996.3 Thus, the evidence was 
sufficient to support his conviction for the second degree 
felony of possession of a dangerous weapon, a rifle, by a 
restricted person. 
2
 Defendant states that "neither officer could say that it 
was a rifle beyond a reasonable doubt" (Br. of App. at 10). This 
statement is incorrect. While neither officer could testify 
definitively as to the specific kind of rifle in defendant's 
possession, they both stated unequivocally that what they saw was 
a rifle. Compare R. 355, 369 with R. 328-29, 375. 
3
 In addition, based on defendant's references to 
"shooting" and "putting holes" in intruders, a jury could 
reasonably infer that the rifle was operable. Thus, even under 
defendant's proposed interpretation of "firearm," the evidence 
was sufficient to convict him. 
13 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS 
DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW 
TRIAL ON THE GROUND THAT AN 
ERROR IN LIMITING CROSS-
EXAMINATION OF A WITNESS WAS NOT 
HARMFUL 
Defendant claims that the trial court committed 
reversible error when it refused to allow cross-examination of 
Dale Smith, an Adult Probation and Parole agent, about whether 
he had authorized defendant to possess a bow and arrows (Br. 
of App. at 12). The trial court, in responding to defendant's 
motion for a new trial on this ground, admitted that the 
ruling was incorrect, but found the error harmless. In 
denying defendant's motion, the court explained: 
Upon review of the arguments, the Court 
is persuaded that its ruling at trial was 
in error in preventing counsel from asking 
the question. However, the error does not 
work the harm which Defendant alleges in 
his motion, in part because Defendant's 
motion mischaracterizes the testimony of 
Dale Smith. At the sentencing hearing on 
June 3, 1997, Dale Smith was sworn and 
examined by defense counsel. The Court 
has reviewed a transcript of that 
testimony. Dale Smith did not admit that 
he ever authorized and consented for the 
Defendant to possess a bow and arrows. 
The Defendant's arguments in this regard 
are erroneous. Dale Smith's answer, under 
oath, was equivocal. He stated he did not 
recall ever giving such permission. Such 
testimony would not establish that 
Defendant had been given permission. 
The strongest testimony Defendant had 
concerning the question of permission, was 
14 
Defendant's father, Nelson Deiter, who 
testified at the sentencing hearing that 
Agent Smith had given permission for 
possession of a bow and arrows. The Court 
made no ruling at trial prohibiting 
Defendant from placing Nelson Deiter on 
the stand and providing such testimony. 
The Defendant chose not to call Mr. Nelson 
Deiter as a witness. Inasmuch as any 
testimony which would have been received 
from Dale Smith at trial was at best 
equivocal, and inasmuch as Defendant was 
not prohibited from calling Nelson Deiter, 
who would have provided the much stronger 
evidence, the Court believes no reversible 
error has occurred. 
R. 163 or addendum A. 
Defendant initially argues that this ruling denied him 
his sixth amendment right to confrontation (Br. of App. at 
12). By failing to raise this concern before the trial court, 
however, defendant denied that court any opportunity to 
adjudicate it. "With limited exceptions, the practice of this 
court has been to decline consideration of issues raised for 
the first time on appeal." Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. of 
Educ., 797 P.2d 412, 413 (Utah 1990). "Utah's appellate 
courts have applied this rule to constitutional questions 
advanced for the first time on appeal." State v. Archambeau, 
820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 1991). Where defendant has 
asserted neither plain error nor exceptional circumstances, he 
has waived consideration of the confrontation clause issue 
before this Court. State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1311 
(Utah 1987) . 
15 
Defendant's remaining argument seems to be that the trial 
court's restriction on the questioning of Agent Smith, 
compounded by its refusal to give defendant's requested jury 
instruction defining "dangerous weapons," precluded him from 
presenting his theory of the case. That is, if Agent Smith 
had given defendant permission to possess a bow, then 
defendant concludes he should not have reasonably known that a 
bow was a dangerous weapon that he, as a restricted person, 
could not possess (Br. of App. at 13). 
This argument fails on the facts, as the trial court 
ruled. At trial, the state moved to preclude defense counsel 
from questioning Agent Smith concerning permission to possess 
the bow unless the defense first laid appropriate foundation 
for that line of questioning (R. 554-55). In response, 
defense counsel proffered that defendant's father had attended 
a parole meeting seven or eight years ago at which Agent Smith 
gave such permission (R. 556). The court subsequently ruled: 
"I'll grant the motion, but if, as you have proposed, you 
intend to put Mr. Nelson Deiter on and he provides that 
testimony, I'll allow you to recall Agent Smith at that point, 
because then there's foundation" (R. 559). 
The defense never called Nelson Deiter to testify at 
trial. Instead, Nelson Deiter appeared at the sentencing 
hearing, where he testified essentially as defense counsel had 
earlier proffered (R. 584-85). Dale Smith testified both at 
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trial and at the sentencing hearing. At the latter, he stated 
that he had been defendant's parole agent in 1983 and, at that 
time, had met with defendant and his father to establish local 
supervision based on a Pennsylvania conviction and parole 
agreement (R. 596, 601-02). He testified, in response to 
leading questions, that he had no recollection of authorizing 
defendant to have a bow thirteen years earlier, but that he 
could possibly have done so (R. 597). He elaborated: 
Regarding that specific probation 
period, when I supervised him, that 
specific probation agreement, I may have 
said that he can have a bow and arrow. I 
may have made some comments to him 
regarding weapons, if they belonged to his 
father and he didn't have access. But, 
again, that was specifically [sic] to that 
probation agreement, to that period of 
time, not necessarily throughout all time. 
(R. 600). Agent Smith then clarified the import of anything 
he might have told defendant in 1983: 
What I'm saying is I think an answer 
that I gave him in 1983 cannot be used to 
answer the same question after he's been 
convicted of several other crimes and been 
on parole and been in prison and had half 
a dozen other probation agents. I don't 
think a question which he asked a 
probation agent in 1983 can apply to a 
probation agreement in 1996. 
(R. 603). 
This testimony, as the trial court observed, was at best 
equivocal (R. 163). Because defendant chose not to call 
Nelson Deiter or defendant to testify at trial, Agent Smith's 
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testimony would have been the only evidence going to the 
question of permission to possess the bow. Testimony that 
Smith had no recollection one way or the other about giving 
such permission would be insufficient to create a reasonable 
doubt that he was guilty of possession of a dangerous weapon 
by a restricted person. 
Defendant takes his argument one step further. Based on 
Agent Smith's purported permission for defendant to possess 
the bow in 1983 and defendant's alleged consequent ignorance 
that the bow was a dangerous weapon, defendant asserts that 
the jury was incorrectly instructed on the definition of 
"dangerous weapon." See Br. of App. at 12-13. Specifically, 
defendant argues that the trial court erred in limiting its 
"dangerous weapon" instruction to the statutory provision 
defining items commonly known as dangerous weapons. See 
Archambeau, 820 P.2d at 928-29. Instead, he thinks the jury 
also should have been instructed concerning items not commonly 
known as dangerous weapons (Br. of App. at 12-13). 
This argument is misguided. Jury instruction #7 
provided: "You are instructed that a dangerous weapon is 
defined as any item that in the manner of it's [sic] use or 
intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily 
injury" (R. 76). In opting for this instruction, which 
mirrors the statutory definition applied to items commonly 
known as dangerous weapons, the court observed: "With regards 
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to the compound bow, it depends on the evidence, but assuming 
it's a compound bow that someone would use to kill an elk or 
deer, I think it would be commonly known as a dangerous 
weapon. If it's a compound bow that kids use in their 
bedroom, you have a different circumstance" (R. 296). 
The instruction given by the trial court, while 
precluding the need for any further instruction, also plainly 
favored defendant. By broadening the definition of dangerous 
weapon to include items both commonly and not commonly known 
as dangerous weapons, the trial court would only have given 
the jury a greater opportunity to find that the bow was a 
dangerous weapon. Furthermore, the analysis applied to items 
not commonly known as dangerous weapons would not have helped 
defendant's case. See Archambeau, 820 P.2d at 929 (items not 
commonly known as dangerous weapons are considered dangerous 
weapons "if, in considering the . . . enunciated 
characteristics, they qualify"). Applying this analysis, 
since the bow was not actually used and, consequently, no 
wound was inflicted, only two characteristics would remain for 
consideration. First, the jury would consider the "character 
of the instrument, object, or thing." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-
501(2)(d)(i). This factor would leave the jury to ponder 
whether a hunting bow designed to kill large mammals was of an 
essentially dangerous character. Second, the jury would 
consider "the other lawful purposes for which the instrument, 
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object, or thing may be used." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-
501(2) (d) (iv). While the jury could speculate that one might 
use a hunting bow for target practice or a costume accessory, 
the evidence showed that the loaded bow was found within arm's 
reach of defendant's bed, ready to shoot. 
Because Agent Smith's equivocal testimony, coupled with a 
broader jury instruction defining "'dangerous weapon," would 
not have created a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
result for defendant, his claim fails. 
POINT THREE 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED 
TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON 
COMPULSION, FORCE IN DEFENSE OF 
PERSON, AND DEFENSE OF 
HABITATION WHERE THESE DEFENSES, 
BY THEIR TERMS, DID NOT APPLY TO 
THE FACTS IN EVIDENCE 
Defendant argues that he was improperly denied jury 
instructions on the defenses of compulsion, force in defense 
of a person, and defense of habitation. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 
76-2-302, 76-2-402, and 76-2-405. Had the jury been so 
instructed, the burden would have shifted to the state to 
refute these defenses beyond a reasonable doubt (Br. of App. 
at 14-15). Because this did not happen, defendant asserts 
that the state's burden was "impermissibly eased," presumably 
requiring reversal (id.). 
Defendant's requested instructions were sought as 
defenses against the charge of possession of a dangerous 
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weapon by a restricted person; to wit, a firearm. In essence, 
then, defendant asserts that his fear of someone entering his 
home provided him with affirmative defenses that relieved him, 
as a restricted person, of the prohibition against possessing 
a dangerous weapon. 
The court ruled on all three of the requested 
instructions. As to compulsion, the court found the evidence 
insufficient to support it: 
I think there's probably few of us, if we 
live long enough in life, that hasn't had 
someone try to open our front door because 
the person thought he was home. It's not 
a good situation to approach him with a 
shotgun or a rifle. So what I'm ruling 
there is I don't think there was coercion 
under the facts heard so far. 
(R. 312). The court then added: 
Secondly, I'm ruling that, as a matter of 
fact, he doesn't have a right to have a 
weapon like a firearm in the home in case 
he does come under attack. I think that's 
one of the rights he loses when he signs 
the conditions of the parole agreement and 
under the statute. So that will be 
denied. 
(Id.). Next, rejecting instructions on both force in defense 
of a person and defense of habitation, the court stated: "He 
has those rights [of using force in defense of a person or 
habitation] as long as it is ^ot with a dangerous weapon" (R. 
313). Later, the court added: "One of his rights that has 
been surgically removed from him for this period of time is 
the right to have a firearm or a dangerous weapon. Except for 
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those, yeah, he has the other rights [to defend himself or a 
third person or defend his habitation using force not 
involving a dangerous weapon], but he's not being prosecuted 
for anything else'7 (R. 316) .4 The court thus refused to give 
the requested instructions, noting their lack of factual 
relevance as well as the potential for unnecessarily confusing 
the jury (R. 314, 316). 
The trial court's decision not to give the requested jury 
instructions was correct because, by their plain language, the 
instructions could not serve as defenses to possession of a 
dangerous weapon by a restricted person, the crime of which 
defendant was convicted. 
First, section 76-2-302, governing compulsion, provides 
in pertinent part: 
(1) A person is not guilty of an offense 
when he engaged in the proscribed conduct 
because he was coerced to do so by the use 
or threatened imminent use of unlawful 
physical force upon him or a third person, 
which force or threatened force a person 
of reasonable firmness in his situation 
would not have resisted. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-302(1) (1996). The offense from which 
defendant seeks insulation is possession of a firearm. 
However, the jury had before it no evidence of any 
4
 The court elaborated: "For instance, if [defendant] had 
the right to approach that door with bare knuckles, fists or a 
night stick or something, he had the right to defend himself, 
yes, but they're not going to hear any evidence about that so why 
tell them that?" (R. 316) . 
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"threatened imminent use of unlawful physical force" against 
defendant. Id. Similarly, the jury had before it no evidence 
that defendant possessed the rifle out of compulsion. The 
facts simply showed that defendant heard a noise in the night 
that made him fearful (R. 263-64). No intruder was ever 
observed by anyone (R. 328-29). On these facts, a jury 
instruction on compulsion was unwarranted. Cf. State v. 
Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 266 (Utah 1988)(jury entitled to 
have theory of case before jury if it would not be superfluous 
because of absence of any evidentiary support). 
Similarly, defendant's other two requested instructions, 
by their plain language, were also inapplicable. Section 76-
2-402, governing force in defense of person, begins with the 
phrase, "A person is justified in threatening or using force 
against another when. . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402(1). 
Section 76-2-405, governing defense of habitation, similarly 
begins with the phrase, "A person is justified in using force 
against another when and to the extent that. . . ." Utah Code 
Ann. 76-2-405(1). These sections, then, serve as 
justifications for the use or threatened use of force under 
particular circumstances. By their plain terms, however, they 
do not serve as justifications for possession of a dangerous 
weapon, the crime of which defendant was convicted. Nor were 
the other requirements of the statutes supported by any 
evidence. Where defendant was not charged with threatening or 
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using force against another, his requested instructions were 
not only superfluous, but carried the potential for 
obfuscation as well. See State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 471 
(Utah App. 1993). Consequently, the trial court correctly 
refused to give them. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm 
defendant's second and third degree felony convictions for 
possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person. 
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ADDENDUM A 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
n. 
JAMES DEITER, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM 
DECISION 
CASE NUMBER: 961000159 
DATE: September 9, 1997 
JUDGE BENHHADFIELD 
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to the Defendant's Motion for New Trial and 
Motion to Reduce Con i Ictic: n The Court has considered these motions as well as the supporting 
authorities and documentation and the opposition filed b) the Pi • z secution \ heai iiig was held 
concerning the motions on August 11, 1997. The Court took this matter under advisement to 
receive additional authorities from counsel. No additional authorities were submitted. 
The Defendant moves the Court for a new trial on the basis that there was insufficient 
n'liuJrim tor Ihr trier mt lai I I ceasonabl) torn hull Illiiil Nit' M In iiiLiiiiil \ is in possession m i 
firearm. This case is unique in that a firearm was not actually recovered from the Defendant. 
There was, however, unrebutted evidence that the Defendant, on the night in question, contacted 
the law enforcement dispatcher concerning a disturbance and threatened to "blow a hole" in 
Si iiiG\~fiit; i( tin;) entered his liui • Tlii^  linen wa& repeated HI several variations. When officers 
arrived at Defendant's home, they observed Defendant in the front loorwaj and on the front poi cli 
holding what appeared to be a .22 caliber rifle. They were not aware of his parole status and so 
simply instructed him to put the gun away. Some time later, during a search of Defendant's home 
by his parole officer, 1ive 22 ammunition was recovered from the residence. There is sufficient 
evidence for a jury to link these facts togethe i and i: easonablj con ::li ide that the Defendant was in 
possession of a firearm. 
The Defendant next requests that he be granted a new trial due to the Court's error in 
refusing at trial to allow defense counsel to question the witness, Dale Smith, an officer of Adult 
ie 
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Probation and Parole, concerning whether he had ever authorized Defendant to have possession 
of a bow and arrows. Upon a review of the arguments, the Court is persuaded that it's ruling at 
trial was in error in preventing counsel from asking the question. However, the error does not 
work the harm which Defendant alleges in his motion, in part because Defendant's motion mis-
characterizes the testimony of Dale Smith. At the sentencing hearing on June 3, 1997, Dale Smith 
was sworn and examined by defense counsel. The Court has reviewed a transcript of that 
testimony. Dale Smith did not admit that he ever authorized and consented for the Defendant to 
possess a bow and arrows. The Defendant's, arguments in this regard are erroneous. Dale Smith's 
answer, under oath, was equivocal. He stated he did not recall ever giving such permission. Such 
testimony would not establish that Defendant had been given permission. 
The strongest testimony Defendant had concerning the question of permission, was 
Defendant's father, Nelson Deiter, who testified at the sentencing hearing that Agent Smith had 
given permission for possession of a bow and arrows. The Court made no ruling at trial" 
prohibiting Defendant from placing Nelson Deiter on the stand and providing such testimony. The 
Defendant chose not to call Mr Nelson Deiter as a witness. Inasmuch as any testimony which 
would have been received from Dale Smith at trial was at best equivocal, and inasmuch as 
Defendant was not prohibited from calling Nelson Deiter, who would have provided the much 
stronger evidence, the Court believes no reversible error has occurred. 
The Defendant's Motion for New Trial is denied. 
The Defendant has also filed a Motion to Reduce Conviction, lowering degree of offense, 
pursuant to UCA 76-3-402. The Court has reviewed said section and notes that it is couched in 
terms of pre-sentence. The closing lines of Subsection 1 state "...the Court may, unless otherwise 
specifically provided by law, enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower degree of offense 
and impose sentence accordingly." 
There is no provision in the statute for the processing or granting of such a motion 
following entry of the judgment. In the present case, the Defendant was sentenced to prison on 
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concurrent sentences for both convictions. Once the sentence is imposed and the judgment 
sentencing Defendant to prison is entered, this Court loses jurisdiction over the Defendant and he 
i1, MICH under the jurisdiction of the Board of Pardons. In the present case, the sentence was 
pronounced on June 3,1997. The Judgment and Conviction was signed h\ ilie Cowl «> i Junk I, 
1997. The Motion for Reduction of Sentence was signed by defense counsel June 6, 1997, and 
filed with the Court on June 10, 1997. The Court is sympathetic to the arguments made in 
support of the motion and would very possibly be disposed to grant the motion with regards to the 
3rd Degree Felony conviction if this Coui t: had jurisdiction. Inasmuch as jurisdiction no \ l lies 
with the Board of Pardons, the Defendant must appeal to that body for any relief which would be 
in effect similar to the relief granted by a 402 motion. 
Date* 
BY THE COURT 
-•73-/14 
BenHHadfield 
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